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Toward a Constitutional Framework for the
Control of State Court Jurisdiction*
Robert H. Abrams"
and Paul R. Dimond***
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court traditionally approaches
issues of state court personal jurisdiction over nonresidents using a due process analysis.' When this analysis is based on
considerations of fundamental fairness to the defendant, this
limitation fits the due process clause's procedural core. 2 The
due process rubric, however, has also been transformed into an
"instrument of interstate federalism" under which conflicts between the states "as coequal sovereigns in a federal system"
are adjudicated.3 This Article contends that the due process
clause is wholly inapposite to these interstate federalism concerns. It proposes that state courts' extraterritorial reach instead should be constitutionally defined under the full faith
* The authors would like to thank Tom Jeffrey and David Engel for their
research assistance in preparing this Article. The authors were supported in
their efforts by a generous grant from the Wayne State Law School Research
Fund.
** Professor of Law, Wayne State Law School
Professor of Law, Wayne State Law School
1. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....". U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g, WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Pennoyer v. Neff, 93
U.S. 714 (1877); cf.4 C. WIGHT,A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRcTIcE AND
PROCEDuRE § 1065 (1969) (consent to personal jurisdiction may be given by the
defendant); MICH.CoMp.LAws ANN.§ 600.701 practice commentary (West 1981)
(residence within the forum state is a sufficient basis for the valid exercise of
personal jurisdiction).
2. See infra text accompanying note 48. See generallyJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DIsmTRusT 14-21 (1980) (discussion of scope of due process clause). It is not
the purpose of this Article to define what that core is; modern views on this
question vary widely. Compare, for example, Abrams, Power, Convenience and
the Elimination of PersonalJurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 58 IND. LJ. 1, 57
(1982) (due process cannot be viewed as requiring stringent limitations on forum availability) with Lewis, The "ForumState Interest" Factorin PersonalJurisdiction Adjudication, 33 MERCER L. REv. 769, 771, 808-35, 849 (1982) (the
purpose of due process in the context of personal jurisdiction is to assure parties a fair forum based on forum contacts).
3. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
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and credit clause,4 with due process analysis limited to issues
of fundamental fairness. 5
Section I of this Article details the Supreme Court's interpretation of due process as a mechanism for protecting both
fundamental fairness to the individual and the country's federal system. This section focuses on the history, purpose, and
structure of the due process clause, concluding that due process's dual role is not compelled by the Constitution and is rendered unsound by the costs of merging the two functions. It
further concludes that federalism issues raised by judicial assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are more appropriately
resolved by Congress. Section II outlines a structure under
which Congress has plenary power to legislate federalism dispute resolution, with the Supreme Court operating as interpreter of this legislation or as a common law mediator in the
absence of legislation. It reviews the text and purposes of Article IV's full faith and credit clause and argues that the clause
grants Congress the constitutional power to adopt the recommended structure. Section III describes specific and general
congressional legislation that would eliminate potential interstate disputes by specifically defining the permissible reach of
state court jurisdiction and addresses the proper role of the
Supreme Court in resolving interstate disputes under the full
faith and credit structure.
I. THE ROLE OF DUE PROCESS IN MEDIATING
POTENTIAL INTERSTATE JUDICIAL FRICTION
A.

THE JUDICIAL MERGER OF

DUE

PROCESS AND FEDERALISM

CONCERNS

Due process focuses on the procedural regularity and the
opportunities that must be afforded to defendants by the judicial process. 6 It guarantees defendants "fundamentally fair"
proceedings,7 with the right to timely notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard before a neutral magistrate. 8 State
4.

U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1.

5. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also
infra notes 54-102 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
7. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
8. See, e.g., J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAw 555-56
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court assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction violate these
guarantees when the inconvenience and expense of responding
to the suits prevent defendants from being heard and from participating in fundamentally fair proceedings. 9 Modern due process analysis, however, also limits the extraterritorial reach of
state courts when the jurisdictional assertions offend interstate
federalism interests.lO This analysis does not turn on fairness
and convenience to nonresidents, but on a state court's power
to reach outside its state borders under a federal system.
The use of due process to determine interstate federalism
concerns began with Pennoyer v. Neff,11 a case involving no interstate dispute whatsoever. Rather, the Supreme Court addressed the extent to which a federal court sitting in the
original forum state was required to give the state court's default judgment full faith and credit. Neff, an easterner, did not
appear in an Oregon in personam action that alleged a failure
to reimburse his Oregon attorney for services rendered. The
Oregon court found personal jurisdiction on the basis of service
of summons by publication. After entry of judgment, Neff's realty in Oregon was attached and subsequently sold to Pennoyer at a sheriff's sale. Neff, invoking diversity jurisdiction,
sued in federal court to obtain possession of the land.12 The
(2d ed. 1982); L. TRmE, AMERCAN CONsTIrruToNAL LAw 507-08, 532-56, 562-63
(1978).
9. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 808-14; Redish, Due Process,Federalism, and
PersonalJurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112, 1143
(1981).
10. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980); Lewis, supra note 2, at 812-14.
11. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State
CourtJurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241; Redish, supranote 9, at 1115-16, Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitations on State Court Jurisdiction: A HistoricalInterpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses (pts. 1 & 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 735 (1981).

12. The district court sustained Neff's challenge on the ground that the Oregon state court lacked jurisdiction over Neff because service of process by
publication did not fully comply with Oregon's own procedure. Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1286-88 (D. Or. 1875) (No. 10,083). Consequently, the judgment was unenforceable in Oregon, and thus not entitled to full faith and credit
elsewhere. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Oregon courts
would recognize and enforce the judgment and sale despite minor procedural
irregularities. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 721. Therefore, the judgment was entitled to "have such faith and credit given to [it] in every court within the
United States as [it] ha[s] by law or usage" in Oregon, provided that the Oregon court had proper jurisdiction. Id. at 729 (quoting Act of May 26, 1790, ch.
XI, 1 Stat. 122 (1790) (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976)) (legislation enforcing the full faith and credit clause of U.S. Const. art IV, § 1)). The
Court, however, found the Oregon court unable to gain personal jurisdiction
over Neff through service by publication alone. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court reasoned that, before the Oregon state court
could obtain personal jurisdiction, Neff, a nonresident, must be
served either with process within the forum state or by substituted service after seizure of his property.13 Neither was done
in Neff's case, so the Oregon court's judgment was not entitled
to full faith and credit in the federal court under the governing
statute.14
The actual holding in Pennoyer is narrow: a state court's
jurisdiction over the person and the dispute may be collaterally
attacked, and, if the attack is successful, the court's judgment is
not entitled to full faith and credit.15 The Court followed this
holding, however, with dictum asserting that collateral attack is
not the sole method for raising challenges to the sovereign authority of the forum state.16 Read in conjunction with the
Court's discussion of state sovereignty limits based on territoriality,17 the opinion indicates that due process provides grounds
for resisting assertions of personal jurisdiction on the basis of
"interstate federalism." The opinion also implies, however, that
these territorial limitations on state judicial power predate the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause and are rooted in
the law of nations and the structure of the nation announced in
the United States Constitution.' 8
13. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 727.
14. Id. at 734. The Court also found that failure to attach the Oregon property before the original action prevented the Oregon state court from obtaining
quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 720.
15. The Court's finding that jurisdiction can be collaterally attacked is
stated as a foregone conclusion:
In the earlier cases, it was supposed that the act [of May 26, 17901 gave
to all judgments the same effect in other States which they had by law
in the State where rendered. But this view was afterwards qualified so
as to make the act applicable only when the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter, and not
to preclude an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court in which the
judgment was rendered, or the right of the State itself to exercise authority over the person or the subject-matter.
Id. at 729.
16. Id. at 722. The Court's discussion was unnecessary to its holding because the only issue was Neffs ability to collaterally attack the jurisdictional
basis of the Oregon judgment. See supra text accompanying note 11.
17. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720:
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other
forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of
power, and be resisted as mere abuse.
18. See id. at 723-25, 729-33; Redish, supra note 9, at 115-16. Such concerns
may also be understood as judicial interpretation of the 1790 Act implementing
the full faith and credit clause.
Pennoyer discusses territorial limitations inherent in a federal system at
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Pennoyer v. Neffs infusion of "vague concepts of interstate
sovereignty into the due process clause" has guided the
Supreme Court's thinking throughout the ensuing century. 9
Although the Court has abandoned the rigid territorial limits
on sovereign power prescribed in Pennoyer,20 its use of due
process to restrict state sovereignty continues. For example, in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,21 the Court relied on
Pennoyer in stating that the due process clause "does not con-

template that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which
the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." 22 Although the
Court discussed litigant inconvenience as related to the issue
of due process fairness to the defendant,23 it still measured the
"reasonableness" of the state court's exercise of jurisdiction "in
length, and does so well before any reference to the due process clause. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720-26 (examining federalism restrictions on
state court jurisdiction) with id. at 733 (examining due process restrictions on
obtaining jurisdiction by service of process). In the first paragraph discussing
the due process clause, the Court states:
[Due process means] a course of legal proceedings according to those
rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To
give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent
by its constitution-that is, by the law of its creation--to pass upon the
subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination
of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its
jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary
appearance.
Id. at 733. Pennoyerdoes not indicate that due process in and of itself requires
intraterritorial service of process or substituted service of process after seizure
of property within the state. Due process considerations, if they are involved at
all, constrain the use of process to obtain jurisdiction on procedural fairness
grounds. Territorial restraints relate to due process only to the extent that they
are proxies for fairness.
Although Pennoyer'smerger of federalism concerns into due process analysis is objectionable dictum, see infra notes 39-63 and accompanying text, one of
the authors of this Article generally supports the emphasis Pennoyergave to
territorial power as an indicium of when a sovereign may insist that a defendant appear in its courts. See Abrams, supra note 2. The issue of whether substantial presence within a sovereign's territory renders the sovereign's exercise
of in personam jurisdiction fundamentally fair, however, has little bearing on
the issue under discussion in this Article, ie., the methods for resolving interstate frictions spawned by state courts' assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
19. Redish, supra note 9, at 1113-14.
20. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20
(1945) (territorial presence not required if "minirum contacts" exist between
defendant and forum).
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. Id. at 319.
23. Id. at 316-17.
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the context of our federal system." 24 The Court stated this reliance on interstate federalism more emphatically in Hanson v.
Denckla,25 noting that the existence of minimum contacts reflects considerations of the "territorial limitations of the power
of the respective states" and does not turn on considerations of
fairness and convenience to nonresident defendants.26
While the Supreme Court unequivocally confirmed the role
interstate federalism plays in due process determinations in its
recent decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,27
other decisions indicate that this role may be declining in significance. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee28 signals a potential future divorce of the
24. Id. at 317.
25. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
26. Id. at 251.
27. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen concluded
that due process's demand for minimum contacts served two alternative ends.
First, it protected defendants against unfair "burdens of litigating in a distant
or inconvenient forum." Id. at 292. Second, it limited state courts' assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction "to ensure that the States, through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system." Id. The Court concluded that even if no inconvenience resulted to the defendant and the state had a strong interest in the
controversy, the due process clause, "acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment." Id. at 294.
World-Wide Volkswagen involved an action brought in Oklahoma state
court for damages sustained when an allegedly defective automobile burst into
flames after being involved in an accident, severely burning the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs had purchased the car in New York, from a New York retailer, while
they were New York residents. They were driving through Oklahoma to Arizona when the accident occurred. In addition to naming the foreign manufacturer and the American importing company as defendants, the suit named both
the New York retailer and its wholesaler, neither of whom did business in
Oklahoma. The Supreme Court found that due process forbade the Oklahoma
court from exercising in personam jurisdiction over the latter two defendants.
The basis for the Court's finding of a due process violation, however, is confused. Jurisdiction was apparently denied because of the total lack of contacts
between the defendants and the forum. See id. at 295. Whether this lack of
contacts violates procedural fairness or interstate sovereignty is unclear from
the Court's opinion. The Court's recitation of the "parade of horribles" that
would confront the sellers of chattels if jurisdiction were allowed suggests a
procedural unfairness rationale. See id. at 296. However, interstate federalism
language, such as that quoted above, dominates the decision, making it a fair
conclusion that jurisdiction was denied to protect interstate federalism. Further, because Oklahoma was the state where the accident occurred and witnesses were to be found, it was a logical and relatively convenient forum with a
strong interest in applying its own law to the case. Thus, it seems that unstated federalism concerns likely influenced the refusal to permit Oklahoma jurisdiction over the objecting defendant.
28. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). Insurance Corp. of Ireland involved a breach of
contract suit brought in a Pennsylvania federal court seeking excess insurance
proceeds for business interruption losses. The foreign insurers defended by as-
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interstate federalism and due process analyses. The Court's
description of the due process inquiry in In.urance Corp. of Ireland stressed that personal jurisdiction represents a restriction
on judicial power as a matter of individual liberty, and not as a
matter of sovereignty. 29 This critical departure from previous
articulations of due process requirements is discussed in a
footnote:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and
the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other states.... The restriction on state sovereign power .... however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause. That clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement- Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the
individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise
be protected. 30

The Court's retreat from the strict application of the federserting the court's lack of in personam jurisdiction. Id- at 701-02. Plaintiffs pursued discovery to establish that the insurers had sufficient contacts with
Pennsylvania to support jurisdiction. I& at 698. The insurers refused to comply with the discovery requests, despite the court's warning that continued refusal would result in an order finding personal jurisdiction for the purposes of
the suit. Id. at 699. The Supreme Court upheld the eventual imposition of this
sanction, finding that the insurers' actions amounted to a legal submission to
the court's jurisdiction. In the process of its analysis, the Court carefully delineated the differences between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction and the constitutional constraints each places on the federal courts. Id. at
701-02. The Court's discussion of the role federalism concerns play in due process arose in the context of this analysis.
29. Id. at 702. This action was brought in federal rather than state court.
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Powell states that, absent a specific
rule or statute establishing a federal basis for personal jurisdiction, the same
jurisdictional standards apply to federal courts and to the courts of the states
in which they sit. These standards include the due process-based federalism
concerns articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen. Id. at 711-12 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
30. Id. at 702 n.10. This part of the Court's opinion was adopted by eight
Justices. Justice Powell concurred in the result but dissented strenuously from
this part of the opinion. See id. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring).
A recent choice of laws decision, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(1981), indicates that Justice Stevens strongly supports separating federalism
concerns from due process in that context. Justice Stevens's concurrence in
Hague urges that the due process inquiry relates only to unfair surprise to litigants in a court's choice of governing law. Id at 327. The federalism concerns
implicated by a state's refusal to apply another state's laws in a suit is a separate and unrelated inquiry. See id. at 322. Justice Stevens asserts that such
questions of state sovereignty must instead be addressed under the full faith
and credit clause, see id, the same assertion made by this Article, see infra
notes 65-102 and accompanying text.
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alism concerns in the due process analysis is highlighted in
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.31 In Keeton, the plaintiff
brought a diversity suit in a New Hampshire federal court alleging defamation by defendant's nationally circulated magazine. Neither party resided in New Hampshire, and only a
small percentage of the magazines were sold there. 32 In analyzing the personal jurisdiction issue raised by these facts, the
courts apply the general federal diversity rule that treats such
issues as if they had been raised in state court. 33 The First Circuit rejected the district court's assertion of jurisdiction on federalism grounds, stating that "the New Hampshire tail is too
small to wag so large an out-of-state dog."3 4 The Supreme
Court, however, sustained the state's jurisdiction over the defendant, making no allowance for these federalism concerns.
The Court's opinion stresses that the defendant suffered no
due process unfairness in answering "for the contents of that
publication wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed."35 Keeton's discussion of federalism
concerns does obliquely imply that due process requires less
forum state contact in suits with little extraterritorial impact.30
Despite this comment, however, the decision pays federalism
concerns scant attention, and in fact appears to ignore its own
statements on the role of interstate federalism in due process
analysis. Not only were the forum state contacts in Keeton
slight, but a prior Ohio judgment had dismissed Keeton's
claims based on the same publication. 37 The case thus
31. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
32. Id. at 1477. Plaintiffs choice of New Hampshire as a forum state undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that New Hampshire has the nation's longest
statute of limitations for defamation actions. On the date of filing, New Hampshire was the only state in which the action was not barred. See id.
33. See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir. 1963).
For an extended critique of the "general rule," see generally Abrams, supra
note 2.
34. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1982).
35. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. at 1482.
36. Id. at 1478 ("[lit is certainly relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry that
petitioner is seeking to recover damages suffered in all States in this one suit.
The contacts between respondent and the forum must be judged in light of that
claim, rather than a claim only for damages sustained in New Hampshire.").
This discussion implies that fewer contacts would be constitutionally necessary
to sustain personal jurisdiction had the plaintiff sought damages only for those
injuries sustained in New Hampshire.
37. In the prior Ohio action, a judgment of dismissal was entered after a
finding that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d at 33. The federal district court, sitting in diversity,
adopted the New Hampshire choice of law rule that viewed the prior dismissal
as procedural and did not give it conclusive weight. Nor was New Hampshire
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presented both strong federalism concerns arising from its de
facto circumvention of the Ohio judgment and substantial extraterritorial impact through its validation of a damage award
representing injuries suffered in all states receiving the defamatory publication.3 The Court's avoidance of federalism concerns reflects their diminishing role in due process analysis
and demonstrates the need for clarification of the current status of these concerns.
B. THE COSTS OF MERGING DUE PROCESS AND FEDERALISM
CONCERNS
The Court's continued reliance on Pennoyers dictum raises
several practical, jurisprudential, and constitutional problems,
each of which takes its toll on the effective functioning of the
judicial system. First, the bases for the Court's limitations of
state court jurisdiction are invariably muddled. Although the
Court states the concern for procedural fairness and the defendant's convenience and the concern for interstate federalism separately,3 9 it never isolates these factors when judging
whether the extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction meet the
due process requirements, 40 and no clear guidelines emerge.
When this failure is coupled with the Court's own confusion,41
bound tolfollow Ohio's statute of limitations because New Hampshire is one of
the few states that has not adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Statute of Limitations Act, an Act that borrows other states' shorter limitation periods in this
situation.
38. Under the single publication rule, the entire edition of the magazine is
treated as only one publication. This doctrine allows the plaintiff to prove mere
general distribution of the libel and to show the extent of distribution, including distributionin otherstates, as an indication of damages. W. PAGE KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 113 (1984).

39. See, eg., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292

(1980).
40. See, e.g., icL World-Wide Volkswagen is distressingly unclear as to
whether the Oklahoma court's assertion of jurisdiction violated due process because Oklahoma had too little interest in the case, because it was too burdensome and inconvenient for the New York retailer to defend in Oklahoma, or
because Oklahoma was somehow attempting to intrude on New York's sovereign authority over its local retailers. See supra note 27.
41. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984), where the
Court appears to have difficulty defining the role federalism concerns occupy in
due process jurisprudence and the application of that role in the case sub
judice. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (both unfairness and federalism
restrict extraterritorial exercises) with Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 &n.10 (1982) (federalism is not an
independent restriction on the sovereignty of the court). But see Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322-32 (Stevens, J., concurring) (defining his view of
the separate roles of due process and federalism).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:75

prediction of future due process applications becomes impossible. 42 Ultimately, this morass generates costly and wasteful
threshold litigation over state court exercises of jurisdiction.
Second, the entities presumably suffering from state
courts' overextensions of jurisdiction are those states whose interests in the federal system are encroached upon. The states,
however, exhibit a curious lack of complaint regarding sister
states' assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.43 Instead, a
private party usually seeks to defend itself by claiming, in essence, to represent the absent state's sovereignty interest. Not
only does this stand the paradigm of states as parens patriae
on its head,44 but it conflicts with credible evidence that most
affected states would not object to a sister state's use of a longarm statute to gain personal jurisdiction.45 Thus, federalism
does not justify allowing an individual to assert the state's supposed interest as a personal due process right when the state
could, if it wished, intervene in the suit or otherwise indicate
that it perceives extraterritorial jurisdiction as an affront to its
state sovereignty.
Third, the Court's use of the due process clause as an instrument of interstate federalism does not fit the historic structure of judicial review. In interpreting the content of due
process, the Court acts as the final arbiter of the constitutional
requirements.4 6 Neither Congress nor the states can revise the
42. For an example of how prediction is simplified when the personal jurisdiction inquiry is reduced to issues of fairness and convenience alone, see generally Abrams, supra note 2. One result of this reduction is that it permits
courts to consider means of mitigating the hardships of distant litigation rather
than insisting on dismissal. Id. at 36; see also infra note 110.
43. Virtually all states have enacted long-arm statutes extending jurisdictional reach to its furthest constitutional limit. See, e.g., CAL. CIrv. Pnoc. CODE
§ 410.10 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1982); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a)
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1983-84); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (Supp. 1981); VA.
CODE § 8.01-328.1 (1984). The legislative adoption of any long-arm statute by
state officers sworn to uphold the federal constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, indicates the belief that extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction are constitutionally permissible, at least to the extent of the statute adopted.
44. Parens patriae is the doctrine that a state may represent the interests
of its citizens in litigation that touches on their combined individual or collective rights. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972). Litigation conducted by a state on behalf of its citizens subsumes their individual
interests. Cf Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a RiparianJurisdiction,24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 591, 610-11 (1983) (the norm in apportioning water rights among
competing users in different states is for a state to initiate the litigation).
45. See supra note 43; see also J. CHOPER, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLrnCAL PROCEss 203-05 (1980).
46. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1802); J. CHOPER, supra note 45, at 199;
J. NOWAY, supra note 8, at 1-21.
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outcome. Congress may pass legislation that "enforces" or "extends" the requirements, but it may not "dilute" them. 4 7 The

Court's primacy in interpreting the minimum constitutional
protection afforded individualsunder the due process clause is
consonant with its traditional role as a judicial counterweight
against imbalances of political power and majoritarian tyranny.4 8 The Court drastically departs from the normal power
allocation, however, when it allows due process to limit state
courts' extraterritorial jurisdiction on federalism grounds. Congress, not the Court, is invariably the final arbiter of interstate
frictions, whether it be under the commerce clause, 4 9 the compact clause,50 or the full faith and credit clause. 5 1 Although the
Court often serves as a forum of first instance when Congress
has not spoken, it openly acknowledges the power of subse52
quent congressional modification of interstate legal relations.
47. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 250 n.32 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966); U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5. There is an alternative view that would generally defer to congressional exercises of power
under § 5 by interpreting the word "enforce" as removing any limits on such
power. See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 272, 272 n.61; Cohen, Congressional Power
To Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L REv. 603, 620 (1975).
Even under this view, however, otherwise plenary congressional enforcement
power is still constrained, for example, by the fifth amendment's due process
clause. See id. Under either view of the proper structural limits on congressional power, judicial interpretations of due process under the fourteenth
amendment would not be subject to congressional reversal or dilution.
48. See J. CHOPER, supra note 45, at 64-65; J. ELY, s-upra note 2, at 50.
49. See J. CHOPER, supra note 45, at 205-09. Dean Choper correctly notes a
distinction between the roles of individuals' challenges in due process federalism cases and in interstate commerce clause federalism cases. Nonresident individuals and national interests are not represented in state legislative decision
making, so some national forum is needed to insure that the state has not trammelled the constitutional limits of the interstate commerce clause. The
Supreme Court, however, does not act as the final arbiter of these interstate issues; its results are subject to congressional revision. I& at 205-08. Compare
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (state liquor regulation runs afoul of dormant commerce clause) with In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 55 (1891) (congressional exercise of power authorizes state liquor regulation); compare City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (federal common law could give rise to claim for
abatement of nuisance of interstate water pollution) with City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 301 (1981) (congressional action has preempted federal common law in area of interstate water pollution).
50. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cL 3; Texas v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 2558, 2561
(1983).
51. See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 49; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 768-80 (1945); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L
REv. 1 (1940). The roles of the Court and Congress in resolving tensions of interstate federalism can be understood in another way that leads to the same
power allocation. In the absence of congressional legislation, the Court in the
first instance posits a constitutional right in interpreting the constitutional
structure with respect to the particular state action. Once Congress speaks
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Congress thus retains the ultimate power to establish alternative policies to control federalism concerns, and the Court's reliance on due process to limit state sovereignty by restricting
state court jurisdiction is an aberrant allocation of power be53
tween the Court and Congress.
These flaws, when viewed in the aggregate, indicate that
due process analysis is an inappropriate means of addressing
federalism concerns raised by the extraterritorial reach of state
court jurisdiction. Moreover, the due process clause makes no
mention of federalism concerns, as recognized by the Supreme
Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee,54 nor do the congressional debates on the
clause refer to resolving such interstate tensions.5 5 This omission cannot be dismissed as resulting from unfamiliarity with
the potential for interstate strife over the issue; conflicts involvpursuant to enumerated and plenary power, the Court then reviews such congressional action pursuant to the rational basis/appropriate means test first articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419-21 (1819). See C.
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW (1969); L. TrnE,
supra note 8, at 401-09.
53. Some other occasional invocations of due process limit state power in
other contexts, most notably in apportionment of state taxation of multistate
activity. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 8, at 282-361. Those
cases, however, are decided as well under commerce clause analysis. Id. Moreover, the Court defers to subsequent congressional redetermination of the issues involved. Compare Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959) (due process not violated by state tax on foreign corporation when tax is fairly apportioned and where taxpayer engages in
substantial income producing activity in the state) and 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1982)
(no state shall have the power to tax income derived from interstate commerce
if solicitation of orders is taxpayer's only business activity within the state)
with Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275, 280 (1972) (purpose of § 381 is to define clearly a lower limit for the exercise by a state of its
power to tax income of foreign corporation so long as tax is fairly apportioned
to taxpayer's activity within state); compare McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 1012 (1982) (no act of any state shall be construed to invalidate or supersede any state law regulating or taxing the business of insurance) with Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1946) (effect of McCarran Act
is to sustain state tax imposed on foreign insurers even on assumption that failure to require similar tax on domestic insurers may constitute a discrimination
against interstate commerce). Like the jurisdiction cases, these cases are unsound to the extent that they still embrace the due process rationale.
54. 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982); see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying
text.
55. The relatively sparse debates, however, do address the issue of national versus state power in protecting individual rights. See, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 697, App. 83-84, App. 153 (1871) (Reps. Edmunds,
Garfield & Bingham, respectively, discussing 1871 Civil Rights Act); CoNa.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (Rep. Bingham discussing fourteenth
amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459-60 (1866) (Rep. Stevens
discussing fourteenth amendment); CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118
(1866) (Rep. Wilson discussing 1866 Civil Rights Act).
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ing judicial jurisdiction were well known by the states in the
pre-Civil War era.5 6 Nevertheless, the text and legislative history relate only to the individual's constitutional rights to state
enforcement of constitutional duties and not to the rights of
7
one state against another.5
IL A PROPOSED SOLUTION UNDER THE FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE
A.

A RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE

This Article contends that the ultimate responsibility for
resolving federalism concerns over state courts' extraterritorial
jurisdiction should rest not with the Supreme Court but with
Congress, a body institutionally better equipped to legislate
federalism outcomes that are sensitive to the needs of the
states. 5 8 This structure not only conforms to the traditional allocation of power between the Court and CongressS9 but more
faithfully adheres -to the text and intent of the due process
clause. The due process clause should not be burdened with
the baggage of resolving speculative interstate disputes over
state court assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction; 60 it is bet56. Specifically, jurisdiction involving runaway slaves was a divisive issue
between the states. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fullerton, 22 Va. Rep. (1 Rand.) 15 (1821);
see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611-12 (1842) (no state
before Constitution's adoption had power over slaves except within state's own
territorial limits); cf R. BERGEn, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICLARY 61, 222-26
(1977) (arguing that Congress had to be aware of jurisdictional issues due to
the North's burning resentment of judicial enforcement of the federal fugitive
slave clause).
57. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supranote 56; Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause:
Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 Mxci. L. REv. 462, 494-502
(1982); Redish, supra note 9, at 1121.
58. Cf. supranotes 49-51 and accompanying text (Congress is final arbiter
of most interstate conflicts).
59. See supranotes 46-53 and accompanying text.
60. But see Brilmayer, How Contacts Count Due Process Limitations On
State Court Jurisdiction,1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77. The thesis of this Article is not
wholly at odds with Professor Brilmayer's defense of the interstate sovereignty
aspects of the World-Wide Volkswagen case. The primary ground of disagreement between Professor Brilmayer's position and this Article is nonetheless an
important matter of constitutional structure-whether the issues of interstate
federalism should be resolved under the full faith and credit clause rather than
under the due process clause. The thesis of this Article favoring full faith and
credit permits the Court to make a resolution subject to revision by the Congress. Indeed, a number of the interstate sovereignty concerns adduced by
Professor Brilmayer coincide with this Article's suggestions for congressional
and judicial action under the full faith and credit clause. Compare id. at 84-86
with infra notes 103-48 and accompanying text.
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ter reserved for the protection of the individual right to a fair
proceeding providing notice and opportunity to be heard.
Under the proposed restructuring of jurisdictional dispute
resolution, the Supreme Court would interpret state jurisdiction limitations under congressionally established standards or,
in the absence of legislation, under federal common law. 61
Nonresident defendants could challenge the fairness of state
court assertions of jurisdiction directly in the forum court. Unless Congress or the Court specifically provided otherwise,
however, a defendant could challenge correlative limits on state
sovereignty only by collateral attack in the enforcement proceedings of states other than the forum state. The Supreme
Court would then referee any federalism disputes resulting
from the enforcement court's ruling.
This framework eliminates most, if not all, of the difficulties
created by due process enforcement of federalism limitations,
while preserving the due process protection of fairness and
convenience for nonresident defendants. By separating the
concerns of federalism and fundamental fairness, the Court
could avoid decisions such as World-Wide Volkswagen 62 and
Keeton,63 in which the Court's reasoning is obvious only to itself. The Court could instead focus its energy on clearly defining the fundamental fairness right. At the same time, the
proposal allows the Court to referee interstate federalism disputes arising from jurisdiction claims only after a collateral ruling raises an actual dispute, when the affected states' positions
are more clearly established. Finally, Congress remains free to
legislate results different from those reached in the Court's provisional decisions.
This proposal is of negligible value, of course, if it cannot
be implemented. This Article contends that Congress has the
constitutional power to adopt the recommended structure for
governing interstate jurisdictional disputes. The exercise of
this power is not only demanded by the problems just ex61.

Cf. infra text accompanying notes 95-99 (analogous operation of com-

merce clause).
62. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see
supra note 27.
63. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); see supra notes
31-37 and accompanying text. The result in Keeton, affirming New Hampshire
jurisdiction over a nationally distributed magazine, would remain the same. Indeed, on facts like those in Keeton, it is easy to conclude that the sister state
forum poses no unfairness violating due process. The federalism issues, which
would be delayed for subsequent independent review, pose all of the difficult
questions.
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amined64 but is authorized by the text and purposes of the constitutional provision conferring the power on Congress-the
full faith and credit clause.
B.

THE INTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE FULL FAIrH AND CREDrr

CLAUSE
In contrast to the vigorous controversy surrounding the
proper bounds of due process,65 the Article IV full faith and
credit clause 66 has generated little debate regarding its meaning and application.6 7 The clause's primary purpose is concededly to mediate interstate frictions through a system in which
states' laws and judgments are respected and enforced by sister states. 68 Beyond this, however, the clause's precise meaning and proper operation are clouded in several respects
important to its use in overseeing state court assertions of judicial power. These open issues include the extent to which the
clause controls the enforcement of judgments in sister states
64. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
65. Compare Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937) (fourteenth

amendment does not prohibit as state action all that would be violative of the
Bill of Rights if done by federal government) and Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights' 2 STAN. L REV. 5, 173 (1949) (in ab-

sence of adequate support for incorporation theory, attempt to read Bill of
Rights into fourteenth amendment is simply an effort to put into the Constitution what the framers failed to put there) with Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 70-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (fourteenth amendment intended to
make Bill of Rights applicable to the states) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 162-71 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (both sponsors and opponents of fourteenth amendment believed it made bill of rights applicable to the states);
compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (due process clause protects
individual right to privacy against state action) with id. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J,
dissenting) (privacy is a liberty interest not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without due process of law).
66. The text of the full faith and credit clause reads:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
67. See Jackson, Full Faithand Credit--The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLUm. L. REV. 1 (1945); Sumner, The Full Faith and Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose,34 OR. L. REV. 224 (1955).
68. See Nadleman, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and PoliticalActs,
56 MIc. L. REV. 33, 62-71 (1957); Whitten, supra note 11, at 555-56. But cf. Redish, supra note 9, at 1136 (suggesting that full faith and credit be used only as a
limit on choice of law, not as a federalism-mediating device more generally).
Redish, however, proposes this restriction on full faith and credit's role as a
matter of pragmatism; in modem times, the choice of law issue is a source of
more interstate friction than is the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 1136-37.
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and the respective roles of the Supreme Court and Congress in
overseeing the clause's general command.
The full faith and credit clause literally imposes an unqualified rule that all state court judgments must be respected by
sister state courts. 69 When combined with the supremacy
clause of the constitution, 70 the full faith and credit clause is a
self-executing definition of one aspect of state sovereignty. Refusal to respect sister state judgments violates the supreme law
that all state court judges are sworn to uphold.7 1 Each state,
however, is assured of similar respect for its own judicial
processes. The clause thus advances the states' power in rendering judgments while limiting the states' power in fashioning
independent rules regarding recognition of sister state judgments. Despite the facial clarity of the clause, however, its pre72
cise scope cannot be assayed from the text alone.
The full faith and credit clause first appears in the Articles
7
of Confederation, 73 where it was inserted at the last moment. 4
At the time of the Articles' adoption, courts did not give conclusive weight to foreign judgments.7 5 In his thorough study, Professor Ralph U. Whitten found that eighteenth century colonial
and English practice accorded foreign judgments mere evidentiary weight, a shift from the earlier practice of according such
judgments res judicata effect if the original tribunal had jurisdiction.7 6 Whitten concludes that, given the general desire of
the Articles' draftsmen to preserve state autonomy, the Articles
69. See supra note 66.
70. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
71. All state judges take an oath to "support the constitution of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. V, § 6.
72. The major uncertainties include the meaning of giving "faith and
credit" and the possibility that exceptions exist to the facially absolute
command.
73. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the
records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every
other state." ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IV.
74. Jackson, supra note 67, at 3-4; Sumner, supra note 67, at 229-30.
75. Sumner, supra note 67, at 226. Several articles canvass this material in
detail and as a matter of original research. The text of this discussion is distilled from these works. See Jackson, supra note 67, at 3-7; Nadleman, supra
note 68, at 34-59; Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its
History, 39 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1944); Sumner, supra note 67, at 224-41; Whitten,
supra note 11, at 523-55.
76. Whitten, supra note 11, at 509-10. In the preconstitutional United
States, foreign judgments could include a sister state's judgment. Even within
England some English courts treated the judgments of other English courts as
the equivalent of foreign judgments. This practice can be explained as a result
of the jealousies between the many English court systems (manorial, ecclesiastical, law, and chancery).
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of Confederation provision was intended only to impose a similar rule of evidence, not to require conclusive effect on the merits for sister state judgments. 77
In contrast, the historical record and text of the full faith
and credit clause as included in the Constitution indicates the
intent to grant res judicata effect to sister state judgments. The
same historical materials that show the limited respect given to
foreign judgments 78 also demonstrate that eighteenth century
England gave conclusive effect to judgments of "courts of record."79 More significantly, the framers at the Constitutional
Convention altered the wording and import of the full faith and
credit clause through several drafts. The advisory "Full Faith
and Credit ought to be given" found in an early draft was replaced by the mandatory "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given."8 0 Moreover, language was added granting Congress the
power to prescribe the manner of proof and the effect of state
acts, records, and proceedings.8 1 These modifications highlight
the framers' intent to overcome the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation by resort to a strong national government
with a corresponding reduction in state autonomy, an intent
confirmed by James Madison during the ratification process.82
The unqualified power of Congress to prescribe the effect
of judgments in sister states conceivably allows for federal
mandates demanding that such judgments be accorded conclusive weight. Indeed, Madison noted that the clause prevented
77. Id at 541:
Although the use of the modifier "full" with the evidentiary terms
"faith" and "credit" might suggest a desire to establish a res judicata
effect for state judgments in sister states, the general problem concerning the colonies before the Articles [of Confederation] seems to have
been one of reception per se of sister-colony judgments as evidence.
More importantly, it seems unlikely that the draftsmen of the Articles
would have been willing to prescribe a conclusive effect on the merits
for sister state judgments, given their general desire to preserve state
autonomy.
78. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
79. Radin, supra note 75, at 11. Even judgments rendered by courts of
other nations were given some respect and were allowed to serve as prima facie evidence of the matters that had been previously decided. Id.
80. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (1911);
see also Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the
United States Constitution and a Considerationof the Effect on Judgments of
That Section and of Federal Legislation, 4 COLUmL L REv. 470, 473 n.1 (1904)
(chronicles development of language of clause). Note, however, that the Articles of Confederation provision also contained the mandatory "shall be given."
Whitten, supra note 11, at 543.
81. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 80, at 448; see also supra note 66 (text of
language).
82. THE FEDERAL
No. 42 (J. Madison).
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persons from secreting assets liable to execution in a neighboring state as they had previously done, 83 an example which
holds true only if the original judgment is given res judicata effect.84 Moreover, this effect is consistent with the framers' in-

tent to promote unification of the separate states.
The first Congress, which included many of the framers of
the Constitution, 85 exercised the implementing power granted
by the full faith and credit clause 86 and affirmed the clause's
nationalizing intent. The statute adopted required that the effect of sister state judgments be the same "as they have by law
or usage" in the state of rendition.8 7 To the extent that the rendering state would refuse to reexamine the merits, courts
throughout the nation must likewise refuse. The historical record and text of the clause thus indicates that the clause can be
interpreted to give res judicata effect to sister state judgments,
with the enforcing court able to refuse enforcement only where
federal law or the law of the rendering state so permit. 88
Recognizing this nationalizing role aids in understanding
the relative powers of Congress and the Supreme Court in
resolving interstate frictions in the federal system. As indicated, the clause expressly grants Congress the power to define
the manner of proof and the effect to be given to state court
judgments. 89 The power granted is unqualified and encompasses the ability to establish exceptions to the general rule of
83. Id.
84. If res judicata effect is given to the original judgment, then the judgment debtor gains no legal advantage by secreting assets in the sister state. In
contrast, if mere evidentiary effect is given to the original judgment, the possibility emerges that relitigation of the merits in a second forum would have a
different result. In any event, both the added cost of a nonsummary procedure
and the increased uncertainty of result inure to the benefit of debtors seeking
to avoid payment of previously entered judgments.
85. C. RossrrER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 301 (1966). According to
Rossiter, nineteen of the framers were elected to the first Congress from the
eleven participating states. Eleven were senators and eight were representa-

tives. See id.
86. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1982)).
87. Id. The Act provides in relevant part: "[T]he said records and judicial
proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given
to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken."
Id.
88. But see Whitten, supra note 11, at 542-70. Professor Whitten contends
that Article IV's full faith and credit clause, as well as its implementing statute,
declares only that judgments are admissible as evidence in sister state proceedings and does not mandate res judicata effect for the judgments, See id.
89. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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unflagging respect for sister court judgments. 90 The clause, undeniably concerned with interstate judicial disputes, selects
Congress as the ultimate arbiter of such disputes.
Congress's role in resolving state sovereignty concerns is
familiar. Article I of the Constitution gives Congress plenary
power to mediate in numerous areas prone to interstate friction, including interstate commerce.9 1 The decision whether to
enforce a sister state statute or judgment likewise presents
great potential for interstate dispute. A refusal to enforce effectively negates the sister state's legislative 92 or judicial 93 process. Congress's plenary power to legislate resolution of such
disputes closely parallels its power under the commerce clause
to compel state obedience to national policies that reconcile
competing state interests.9
The full faith and credit clause does not speak to the
Supreme Court's role in resolving interstate judicial disputes.
The similarity between Congress's power under this clause and
the commerce clause, however, suggests extension of the parallel to define the Court's appropriate role in full faith and credit
jurisprudence.
As Dean Jesse Choper's persuasive work demonstrates,
"the Court does not exercise the momentous power of judicial
review" in areas such as the dormant commerce power.95 In
the absence of clearly controlling federal legislation, the Court
resolves interstate commerce disputes as a common law tribunal, creating policies to further national uniformity on a caseby-case basis.96 Congress, however, retains the power "to
90. See Sumner, supra note 67, at 238-39; Whitten, supra note 11, at 603-05.
91. See MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 336 (1819); J.
CHOPER, supranote 45, at 190-92; Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National

Government, 54 CoLurm. L. REV. 543, 543-45 (1954). Other areas of potential interstate strife in which Congress is given plenary power under Article I include
interstate compacts, imports and exports, banking, money, bankruptcy, and
naturalization. U.S. CONST. art. L
92. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
93. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958).
94. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S.
184, 191 (1964) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97
(1824))(Court expressly concedes commerce is subject to plenary congressional control); Houston, E. &W. Ry. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case)
234 U.S. 342, 350 (1914) (noting that where the power of Congress exists "it
dominates" and is "not left to be destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local
governments").

95. J. CHoPEP, supranote 45, at 207 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 207-08.
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speak the final constitutional word" by enacting ordinary federal statutes.9 7 Under this constitutional structure, the Court is
merely a national forum for the provisional resolution of interstate frictions that arise from the parochial self-interests of the
states.9 8 The Congress, representing interests of all people and
all states, retains plenary power to revise or to reverse the
Supreme Court's policies. 99
Basing the Court's full faith and credit role on this model
results in a secure and familiar footing for initial judicial reconciliation of interstate federalism issues under full faith and
credit challenges. The Supreme Court's role in fashioning federal common law for interstate dispute resolution is well established in the commerce clause and other contexts.OO More
important than the familiarity of the Court's role as interstate
mediator, however, is the structural commitment to Congress's
residual authority to legislate different results.'O' The full faith
97. Id. at 208.
98. Id. at 208-09.
99. Id. at 207. As a result of this check on the Court's power, concerns
about the antimajoritarian nature of Supreme Court review of majoritarian decision making are substantially reduced, if not entirely eliminated. Id. at 208; J.
ELY, supra note 2, at 187 n.13.
100. For example, although the famous Erie Railroad decision disclaimed
federal power to fashion a general federal common law, Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), the Supreme Court, in a companion case decided the same day, accepted the need to fashion a federal common law for the
resolution of disputes involving the interests of two or more sister states. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). The
Court also sits as an expositor of common law solutions in interstate disputes
settling state boundary issues, Louisiana v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 1645 (1984);
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1 (1873), and in interstate conflicts over natural resources, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91 (1972); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). The framers recognized the
potential role of the Court in such interstate disputes by granting original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in suits brought by one state against another.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.

101. The Court recently affirmed this residual authority in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (City of Milwaukee I), 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (City of
Milwaukee II), litigation that involved interstate water pollution nuisance. The
Supreme Court initially forged a federal common law remedy for interstate
water pollution, but expressly noted that subsequent federal legislation might
obviate the need for such a remedy or might pursue a policy inconsistent with
the continued existence of the common law remedy. City of Milwaukee I, 406
U.S. at 107. Eight years later, when the case returned to the Supreme Court,
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L No. 92500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.), were held to have
worked exactly such an ouster of Court-fashioned federal common law. City of
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317.
Another recent example involves regulation of the length of trucks engaged
in interstate commerce. After the Court invalidated a number of such state
regulations as placing too great a burden on interstate commerce, Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), Congress responded by
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and credit values are ideally served by this division of authority. 0 2 Thus, the structural analysis of full faith and credit
posits a very substantial role for the Supreme Court in announcing and refining a constitutional common law of interstate respect for judgments and of interstate judicial
federalism.
II.

IMPLEMENTING THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
PROPOSAL IN CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME

COURT
A.

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION

The Congress's primacy under full faith and credit enables
it to define legislatively state courts' jurisdictional limits. Optimally, well-drafted legislation would obviate the need for most
litigation contesting jurisdictional overreaching. In exercising
its power under the full faith and credit clause, Congress could
allocate jurisdiction over certain categories of disputes or more
broadly limit the states' sovereign power independent of the
type of litigation involved. The remainder of this section examines legislation of this type that Congress has already passed
and canvasses alternatives that Congress should consider to
control state court assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
passing legislation that defined the permissible ambit of state regulation, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 97-369, 96 Stat. 1765 (1983) (codified in scattered chapters of U.S.C.). In a
similar vein, congressional ratification of interstate compacts allows the states
to enact and enforce statutes that would otherwise violate the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cL 3; Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441 (1981); J. No-

wAx, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 8, 1982 Supp. 42; ef. R. Abrams, Summary of Legal Aspects of Large-Scale Interbasin Diversion of Great Lakes
Water (1982) (unpublished manuscript) (advocating interstate compact to
achieve result that would otherwise violate the dormant commerce clause).
102. Professor Whitten, although agreeing that Congress has plenary power
under the full faith and credit clause, argues that the Court has no authority to
make major modifications of territorial jurisdiction as a common law tribunal
unless specifically authorized by Congress. Whitten, supra note 11, at 547 &
n.213. Whitten, however, apparently finds congressional authorization for court
review of state court decisions involving respect for foreign judgments in the
statute implementing the full faith and credit clause. Id. at 547-48. Consequently, Whitten's analysis of the full faith and credit clause ultimately yields a
power structure very similar to that expounded by this Article. It is interesting

to speculate, however, on the results of Whitten's thesis if the implementing
statute had never existed. Evidently, if Whitten's view is carried to its logical
conclusion, the power to fashion a common law of respect for judgments would
rest initially with the state courts subject only to congressional revision. See
generally id. at 523-48.
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1. Problem-Specific Legislation
Congress's most prominent effort to control potential interstate jurisdictional conflicts is section 8 of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA).103 This enactment,
codified as part of the judicial code, 0 4 requires stringent respect for sister state custody decrees: "The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and
shall not modify . . . any child custody determination made
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State." 0 5 To qualify for this interstate respect, the rendering court must have jurisdiction under its state laws and
have a statutorily-defined degree of affiliation with the custody
dispute.10 6 Once the rendering court's jurisdiction attaches, it
continues for so long as its state laws allow, provided that the
child or one of the contestants for custody continues to reside
in the state. 0 7 Operationally, this legislation limits original assertions of jurisdiction in child custody cases and prescribes
that the jurisdiction, once attached, is continuing and
exclusive. 0 8
Such congressional resolution of potential interstate jurisdictional disputes is salutary. Henceforth, interpretation of a
single federal statute will govern with facility the divisive and
often litigated issue of respect for child custody decrees. 0 9
Further, the legislation is consistent with the constitutional
structure of full faith and credit adjudication proposed in this
Article. For several decades, conflicting state court child custody determinations gave rise to full faith and credit litigation
103. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568-73 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (1983)).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1983).
105. Id. at § 1738A(a).
106. See id. at § 1738A(c).
107. Id. at § 1738A(d).
108. This truncated description of § 1738A does not do justice to its intricacies, nor does it fully explore the potential interstate jurisdictional disputes in
child custody cases after its enactment. See, e.g., Coombs, Custody Conflicts in
the Courts: Judicial Resolution of the Old and New Questions Raised by Inter-

state Child Custody Cases, 16 FAM. L.Q. 251 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Coombs, Judicial Resolution]; Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction,
Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. Rsv. 711 (1982); Bruch, Interstate
Child Custody Law and Eicke: A Reply to Professor Coombs, 16 FAm. L.Q. 277
(1982).
109. Cf. Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984) (allowing federal district
courts jurisdiction to require that state courts give sister state judgments the
respect required by the PKPA). But see Coombs, Judicial Resolution, supra
note 108, at 268-76 (exploring and predicting problems of interpretation under
28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
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requiring Supreme Court resolution. 110 While the Court struggled mightily to establish a national policy reconciling compet1
ing state interests, finally adopting a "last-in-time" rule," '
Congress intervened and restructured the policy into something akin to a 'Tirst-in-time" rule.112 On reflection, the previ110. See, e.g., Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493 (1981); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187
(1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528
(1953); New York ex reL Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); see also Eicke v.
Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231 (La. App.) (no recognition given to Texas custody decree
that conflicted with a prior Louisiana decree), cert. denied, 406 So. 2d 607 (La.
1981), cert. dismissed 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
The well-known personal jurisdiction case, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978), raised a different but related issue. The defendant father in
Kuiko objected not to the California court's jurisdiction to enter a child custody
decree binding on him but to its jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment for
increased support payments. This distinction, however, does not answer the
related question of Congress's power to alter the Kulko result by appropriate
legislation.
This is a matter of some importance. Kulko can be analyzed as a case that
would remain wholly unaffected by decoupling due process from full faith and
credit. This analysis is premised on the view that the degree of procedural unfairness, stressed by Justice Marshall's opinion, forms the exclusive motivation
for the invalidation of the assertion of jurisdiction over Kulko. Cf. id. at 96-98.
Interstate federalism concerns, then, would play no part in the decision. If
Kulko rests exclusively on due process, however, its result could not constitutionally be changed by federal legislation mandating either child support jurisdiction in the state in which the affected child is present or interstate respect
for such a state's judgment. See supra text accompanying note 47. It seems,
however, as if such legislation, like the PKPA, would fit within the full faith and
credit power as an implementation of an interstate federalism policy regarding
correlative state sovereignty. Thus, should Kulko be viewed as a pure due process decision, Congress would need to reduce the unfairness of the California
forum in order to protect its exercise of its full faith and credit power to make
the defendant subject to a California child support decree free from due process attack. This reduction could be achieved, for example, by requiring that
such a defendant be provided with a means of defending the suit without
travelling to the distant, inconvenient forum. Indeed, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which addresses a similar sort of litigation, allows for litigation from afar. See UmiF. CHLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 19(a), 9 U.L.A.
162 (1968) (permitting a court in another jurisdiction to allow a party to appear
there in a hearing that becomes a part of the record in the original forum); cf.
infratext accompanying notes 118-24 (opt-out provision as means to assure due
process to plaintiff class members in multistate plaintiff class actions).
111. A last-in-time rule, in essence, provides that the later of two conflicting
judgments is entitled to full faith and credit. See Ginsburg, Judgments in
Search of Full Faith and Credit The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L, REv. 798, 798 (1969); cf. New York ex reL Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1947) (sister state's court has same power to modify custody decree as original forum state's court, so such modification by sister state
is not failure to give full faith and credit to original decree).
112. The PKPA is akin to a first-in-time rule because under its provisions a
later judgment is not entitled to recognition if it was entered during the pendency of another state's child custody determination. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(g) (1983). Moreover, jurisdiction over a child custody determination is
statutorily presumed to continue so long as certain conditions are met. Id. at
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ously imposed jurisdictional limits were simply provisional

federalism accommodations hammered out by the Supreme
Court and subsequently replaced by an overriding federal statute.113 The jurisdictional limits in PKPA suggest that Congress
can directly define the jurisdictional reach of state courts in
114
any number of specific areas.
Congress can also reduce possible friction from competing
state jurisdictional assertions by specifying venue in one locale.
To date, Congress has prescribed local venues only in the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977 (FDCPA)."5 The FDCPA
attempts to minimize the imbalance of power between debtors
and commercial creditors by requiring venue for consumer
debt enforcement actions in a locale convenient to the
debtor."16 Courts other than those specified in the FDCPA can§ 1738A(d). Thus, unless the original court's jurisdiction was improper or has
lapsed, later conflicting determinations of other state courts are without effect.
113. The commentators most familiar with the child custody field, however,
fail to see PKPA as obviating constitutional judicial review on full faith and
credit grounds. See Bruch, supra note 108, at 287 ("As final arbiter of the full
faith and credit and due process clauses, the Supreme Court bears the ultimate
burden of deciding this dispute in a way that will promote interstate harmony
...
."); see also Coombs, Judicial Resolution, supra note 108, at 258 n.39.
114. The power of Congress to intrude deeply into the state judicial system
is also exhibited, for example, in the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
cases. See, e.g., Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). The
Mondou case and others like it involve states' resistance to FELA requirements
that state courts entertain FELA litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982). Although these cases do not address which states are appropriate sites for the litigation, they illustrate the constitutionality of congressional action pursuant to
an enumerated power, in this case the commerce clause, to control state court
jurisdiction and procedures. For example, the Court has held that a state court
may be compelled to forego its usual procedure of allowing the judge to rule on
whether a release was fraudulently obtained where the FELA requires submitting that issue to the jury. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 362-64 (1952).
This type of result has also been reached in other areas. See, e.g., Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-94 (1947) (Emergency Price Control Act criminal enforcement provisions must be entertained by state courts); cf. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-71 (1982) (no tenth amendment
violation inheres in ordering state administrative agencies to consider federally
mandated subjects employing procedural standards set by Congress).
The tenth amendment cannot be invoked in opposition to this Article's suggested breadth of congressional power over state courts' extraterritorial jurisdiction because the area was never one entrusted solely to the states. It
involves no direct conflict between national power and matters relating to exclusive state prerogatives within the confines of a single state. See National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-52 (1976). Full faith and credit issues
concern effects that spill over from one state to the next, not matters relating to
internal operations. Only a national forum can resolve such interstate friction.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a) (2) (1982).
116. The permissible venues are "the judicial district or similar legal entity(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or
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not entertain the suit, even if possessed of valid jurisdiction
and state authorized venue.11 7 The FDCPA thus limits territorial overreaching by creditors that permissive state jurisdiction
and venue statutes would otherwise allow. Judgments entered
by courts without FDCPA venue will not be valid.n 8
The extraterritorial powers of state courts continue to raise
difficult issues that would benefit from congressional action.
One of the most interesting of these issues concerns state court

adjudication of multistate common questionn1 9 plaintiff class

actions 120 in states employing an "opt-out" rule. 121 To illustrate

the potential for interstate conflict stemming from these cases,
consider a manufacturer that allegedly breaches a nationwide
promotional offer.122 A plaintiff initiates an action on behalf of
the nationwide class in a state court that applies the opt-out
rule, proceeds to judgment, and loses on the merits. An inter(B) in which such consumer resides ......
Id The only actions excluded from this requirement are actions to enforce an
interest in real property securing the consumer's obligation, which must be
brought in the judicial district or entity where the property is located. See id.
at § 1692i(a) (1).
117. Cf.15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a) (1982) (limiting available districts).
118. Id.
119. In common question class actions, "questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members" of the class. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (3). Courts most
frequently find consumer cases and securities cases to be appropriate for common question class action. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340
(1978); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denfied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). For a thorough discussion of why these issues arise in
the state courts and why they are most germane in the common question area,
see generally Wilton, Nationwide Class Actions in State Courts: The Power to
Bind 4nd the Right to Adjudicate Their Claims (unpublished draft).
120. Defendant classes may also present serious federalism problems amenable to resolution by Congress under the full faith and credit clause. Discussion of defendant classes is omitted, however, because they occur relatively
infrequently and the interstate federalism issues they raise are not inherently
dissimilar from those raised by non-class litigation.
121. An "opt-out" class action rule requires that class members in "common
question" class actions, after receiving notification of certification of the class
by the court, act affirmatively if they wish to exclude themselves from the class
and thus the binding effect of the judgment in the class action. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(c) is a prototype of such a rule. For an exhaustive study of
the policies informing opt-out provisions, see Kennedy, Class Actions: The
Right to Opt Ou4 25 ARiz. L REV. 3 (1983).
122. These are roughly the facts in Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 MI1.2d 7, 428
N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert granted,456 U.S. 914 (1981), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,459 U.S. 86 (1982). The remainder of the textual hypothetical
goes beyond the Miner facts. In Miner, the case originally reached the
Supreme Court based on defendant's allegation that certification of the class
offended the due process rights of noninitiating nonresident class members.
The dismissal of certiorari was attributable to the lack of a final judgment, a
predicate for review. See 28 U.S.C § 1257 (1982).
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state federalism problem emerges when an out-of-state class
member who failed to opt out files an independent action in another state seeking recovery for the same alleged breach by the
manufacturer. When met by a res judicata defense, this plaintiff asserts that the prior judgment was rendered by a court
that overstepped the sovereign prerogatives of its sister states.
If the second state accepts this argument and allows the second
23
lawsuit to proceed, the interstate federalism clash is patent.1
One need not favor a particular result in these cases to appreciate the value of congressional action. If Congress, for example, wishes to promote efficiency and finality, a statute
endorsing the nationwide binding effect of such state court
class action adjudications would obviate virtually all litigation
over the original judgment's effect. Congress's authoritative allocation of judicial power negates the claim that the original
court intruded on a sister state's sovereign interest. This limits
the second claimant to a due process argument asserting that
the original judgment violated that claimant's right to be free
from unfair and inconvenient litigation and thus cannot be
given res judicata effect.124 Alternatively, Congress has several
options if it wishes to limit the state courts' power to adjudicate
these cases. It could follow the PKPA approach and limit class
action jurisdiction to courts in states having the greatest contacts with the common issues. Alternatively, Congress could
specify that such judgments may receive nationwide binding
effect only if the rendering state is affiliated with the litigation;
for example, the rendering state might be the defendant's residence or the site of the defendant's performance of duties common to many or all of the plaintiffs.
123. The refusal of res judicata effect for the original judgment is a necessary precondition for judicial invocation of the full faith and credit clause under
the methodology advocated in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes
156-57. Even if the second court were to honor the original judgment and uphold the res judicata defense, however, Congress would still have the power
under the full faith and credit clause to define the precise contours of the extraterritorial power of the state court systems.
124. Recalling, however, that the hypothetical case is premised on an optout opportunity, this due process objection is trivial. Requiring an individual to
respond to judicial notice by checking a box on a form opting out of the lawsuit
and mailing the form back to the court surely cannot offend due process. Requiring recipients of legal notice to inform themselves of the notice's meaning
no more offends notions of fairness than the common practice of requiring individuals to respond to summons of all varieties. To be sure, court rules control
the contents of summons in a way that aids recipients in understanding the
contents, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and Form 1, but most class action rules
likewise insist that notice be essentially self-explanatory, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(c) (2) (A-C).
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This discussion touches only some of the possible choices
for specific congressional intervention.125 Nevertheless, it
reveals the usefulness of examining federalism issues under
full faith and credit rather than due process analysis. What
courts and commentators have considered a serious due process claim of plaintiff class members 2 6 translates into a rudimentary due process issue and an independent full faith and
credit issue.

2. General Legislation
Congress could also reduce dispute over jurisdictional
overreaching through general legislation limiting or expanding

the permissible boundaries of state court jurisdiction.

27

Again,

125. In the plaintiff class action setting, for example, Congress could also
address the distribution of unclaimed damages, claims of inadequate representation, and the collateral estoppel effects of a successful class suit on those opting out.
126. See, e.g, Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 fl 2d at 20-28, 428 N.E.2d at 485-89
(Ryan, J., dissenting); Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum, 222 Kan. 527, 542-43, 567
P.2d 1292, 1305 (1977); Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 A.B-.AJ. 837, 838 (1977);
Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92
HARv. L. REv. 718, 731 (1979).
127. The most general exercise of the legislative power under full faith and
credit occurred in 1790 and has (with relatively minor modifications) survived
intact. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (current version codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1982)). That such general exercise of the power has been rare
does not, a priori, demonstrate that it is unwise or unthinkably impolitic. The
need to supplement or rethink the 1790 edict is of relatively modern origin and
is largely traceable to the states' widespread adoption of sweeping long arm
statutes and to the emergence of "interest analysis" as a viable choice of law
doctrine. See Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of
Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics, 34 MERCER L. REv. 593 (1983); cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (holding that liberal application of
forum state law under interest analysis does not offend due process of law or
full faith and credit). Only after a forum state asserts far-flung jurisdiction
does the typical modern personal jurisdiction issue arise. See, e.g, Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. CL 1473 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), revld, 638 S.W.2d 870
(Tex. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984). The importance of choice of law considerations in forum choice cannot be overstated. Although plaintiffs desire to
litigate "at home" will result in some cases of jurisdictional overreaching, the
cost and risk of jurisdictional issue litigation checks the plaintiff's desire to obtain in personam jurisdiction in a constitutionally suspect forum solely for the
purpose of subjecting defendant to suit in an inconvenient locale. The probable
dominant motive in forum selection in cases with great potential for jurisdictional overreaching is favorable choice of governing law. See Martin, Personal
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MicC. L REV. 872, 879-80 (1980); Sedler,
Choice of Law in Michigan: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict
of Laws, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1193, 1195 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Sedler, Choice
of Law in Michigan). A paradigm example of this motive is found in Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir. 1982), revd, 104 S. Ct. 1473
(1984); see supranote 32.
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no particular congressional response need be advocated to
demonstrate the benefit of reducing jurisdictional wrangling.
Two general legislative approaches are immediately evident,
however, either of which would eliminate a vast amount of procedural litigation. First, Congress could prescribe venue standards for interstate cases. 128 Second, it could circumscribe the
choice of governing law, diminishing a plaintiffs incentive to
choose a forum having little connection with the litigation. 29
Numerous methods of venue restriction are available, including those discussed above in relation to problem-specific
legislation.130 In suits involving parties from different states,
for example, Congress could limit venue to states with a defined affiliation with the parties or the underlying dispute. Absent proper venue, state court judgments would not receive
acknowledgment outside the rendering state, or, if Congress so
determined, within the state itself. Alternatively, Congress
could require states to grant motions for forum non conveniens
dismissals when certain convenience standards are not satisfied or are better satisfied by other available forums.131 Conceivably, Congress also could mandate that the state courts
preferred on the basis of their affiliation with the litigation hear
the dismissed suits, 32 establishing a system similar to the
133
change of venue statutes controlling lower federal courts.
128. The interstate nature of the cases is not critical to Congress's power to
prescribe venue standards for state courts. Full faith and credit legislation
could control the exportation of even wholly intrastate cases. The legislative
proposal in the text is limited to interstate cases because pure intrastate disputes are seldom the basis for later court refusals to recognize the judgments
and seldom implicate any federalism concerns.
129. See supra note 127.
130. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text.
131. Such legislation would be no more intrusive into the functioning of the
state's judiciary than either the PKPA or the FDCPA, see supra notes 103-17
and accompanying text. These limitations on venue would, depending on their
severity as applied in particular cases, be less severe than the exercise of
either exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction (state jurisdiction ousted,
state judgments a nullity) or removal (state court forbidden to proceed further
with case). The transfer of jurisdiction to sister state courts rather than to federal courts is a distinction that makes no difference to the power analysis. In
both instances, Congress is acting pursuant to an express, plenary power
granted by the Constitution.
132. Such legislation might require disregard of door-closing statutes of the
transferee state. Cf Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir.
1965) (federal diversity court able to disregard state door-closing statute applicable in state court).
133. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1982). The closer analogy is to the latter section, which deals with cases where the original federal venue failed to
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The situation in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 34 illustrates the potential utility of such congressional action. 35 Limiting venue to the state of some party's residence or the state
witnessing the greatest amount of dispute-provoking activity
would eliminate New Hampshire as a possible forum. None of
the parties resided in New Hampshire and only a tiny fragment
of the tortious activity occurred there.13 6 Depending on the legislation's expansiveness, New Hampshire might be able to enforce its judgment within its boundaries. 3 7 Other states,
however, could not accord the judgment full faith and credit in
light of New Hampshire's lack of proper venue. Consequently,

Ohio could not be forced to recognize a judgment in an action it

had previously dismissed.138 The venue restriction would thus

eliminate this potential federalism dispute while preserving the
defendant's due process right to challenge the fairness and convenience of the chosen forum.
A congressionally-mandated application of forum non conveniens would also eliminate New Hampshire as a permissible
satisfy the affiliating criteria in assigning original venue, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (1982).
This proposal, with its emphasis on venue and venue-like concepts, is kindred to a number of suggestions made by prominent commentators hoping to
relieve the courts of the difficulties associated with the modem personal jurisdiction inquiry. See, e.g., Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and
Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CoRNELL L Rnv. 411 (1981) (courts
should base all nonconstitutional restrictions of geographic selection of forum
on venue, looking toward eventual emergence of reasonableness as sole constitutional test of power to adjudicate); Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdictionto
Interstate Venue, 50 O& L. Rav. 103 (1971) (jurisdiction must become venue,
i.e., suit should be permitted where venue is proper (where defendant resides
or conducts activities relevant to the action))- Hazard, Interstate Venue, 74 Nw.
U.L. REV. 711 (1979) (state court territorial jurisdiction should attach if the state
is an appropriate forum according to typical venue criteria); cf. Abrams, supra
note 2, at 42-49 (1982) (venue and change of venue can subsume all work done
by the personal jurisdiction inquiry in federal courts).
134. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); see supra notes 31-37.
135. To the extent that the federalism concerns in Keeton are entwined with
the substantive law of defamation, a more appropriate congressional response
may be problem-specific legislation such as that discussed in the preceding
subsection of the text. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text. Such
legislation would be desirable if, for example, the root problem of Keeton were
viewed as a danger to first amendment values caused by the coincidence of the
"single publication rule," see RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) orLToRTs § 577A(4) (1979),
New Hampshire's unusually long statute of limitations for defamation, see
supra note 32, and its refusal to honor the statutes of limitations of sister
states, see supra note 37.
136. See supratext accompanying note 32.
137. If the legislation controlled only the exportation of the judgment, New
Hampshire's ability to enforce the judgment within the state would be
unimpaired.
138. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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forum for hearing the dispute. Litigant and witness convenience are only two of several factors considered in deciding forum non conveniens motions;139 also pertinent are efficient
judicial administration and the problems of imposing jury duty
in regions far removed from the controversy's center.140 In
Keeton, not only were the litigants and many of the witnesses
inconvenienced by the forum location, but one court had already dismissed the claim'41 and the proposed forum of New
Hampshire was virtually unrelated to the dispute. 4 2 A motion
of forum non conveniens clearly should be granted by a New
Hampshire court. Consequently, the federalism dispute with
Ohio143 would not arise.
Limiting the available choice of law provides a second potential means of reducing jurisdictional disputes. The benefit
of another state's advantageous laws often provides one of the
primary motivations for initiating an action in a court removed
from the litigants or the controversy. In Keeton, for example,
New Hampshire was selected as the forum state because it had
the longest statute of limitations for defamation actions.1 44
Congress could reduce this forum shopping by requiring all
states to follow a choice of law methodology that results in uniform application of the same law to a particular dispute. Eliminating the reasons to choose an unrelated forum greatly
reduces the potential for federalism disputes. This legislation
is more controversial than the proposed venue restrictions,
however, because it is similar to the "vested rights" choice of
law theory145 and to the "most significant contacts" test, 46 both
47
of which are apparently declining in acceptance.
139. Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
140. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), cited with approval in
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981).
141. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text accompanying note 32.
143. State interests other than Ohio's may also be offended by a New
Hampshire judgment in Keeton. A judgment rendered in New Hampshire that
includes nationwide damages also ignores the policies of other states in setting
short statutes of limitations for defamation actions.
144. See supra note 32.
145. The "vested rights" approach is usually associated with RESTATEMENT
(FiRsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). The thrust of the philosophy is that all
legal controversies, from the moment of accrual of the cause of action onward,
are properly governed by the law of one particular jurisdiction. In tort law, for
example, the lex loci rule is a product of this approach. See id. at ch. 9
("Wrongs").
146.

See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFUCT OF LAws § 145(1) (1971).

147.

See, e.g., Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules:
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Regardless of which of these diverse options Congress
selects, it can effectively divide judicial power among the several states under its full faith and credit power and thus perform its traditional function of resolving interstate disputes.48
Moreover, such legislation would not restructure the ultimate
balance of power between the states. To the extent that a state
would be prevented from rendering a binding decision, it would
benefit through identical limitations on sister states' exercises
of power that would otherwise impinge on its jurisdictional
interests.
B. THE

ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT

Even in the absence of the posited legislation, the structure
proposed in this Article allows the Supreme Court to render a
full faith and credit disposition free from the distraction of concurrent due process considerations. Further, the Court can
take comfort in the realization that any answer it gives is subject to congressional revision. The proposed restructuring of
federalism dispute resolution redefines the Supreme Court's
role both procedurally and substantively. None of these
changes, however, dramatically alters the Court's operation or
requires a radical renunciation of earlier decisional law. Nevertheless, the effect on the Court of separating full faith and
credit concerns for interstate federalism from due process concerns for the individual merits discussion.
The procedure and context in which the Court considers
the due process concerns for the individual are undisturbed by
the separation. Convenience and fairness to the defendant in
forum selection are still prerequisites to adjudication by the forum court.14 9 Consequently, these considerations remain wel
suited to resolution in the litigation's formative stages.150
JudicialMethods in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L REV. 975 (1977); Sedler,
Choice of Law in Michigan, supra note 127, at 193.
148. Indeed, if any doubts persist about congressional power under the full
faith and credit clause to resolve friction arising from state court assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court has surely conceded Congress plenary
power under the commerce clause so long as the legislation does not violate external limits imposed, for example, by the Bill of Rights. E.g., National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1975) (citing United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570 (1968) (sixth amendment) and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)
(fifth amendment)). Given, however, the full faith and credit clause's clear textual authorization giving Congress plenary power over the extraterritorial effect
of state court judgments, see supra notes 69-88 and accompanying text, there is
no reason to rely on the commerce clause in this area.
149. See hTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. V. WASHUNGTON, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
150. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b), (g), (h). This initial determination pre-
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Moreover, the due process concerns are personal rights of the
defendant, so the adjudicating court's rejection of a due process
claim is best reviewed directly to avoid perpetuating the violation of these rights through enforcement of the judgment in the
forum state or elsewhere.'15 Therefore, only the scope of the
Court's substantive inquiry under due process is affected by
the separation.
In contrast, the Court's full faith and credit examination of
interstate federalism disputes under the proposal will arise
under a markedly different procedure. The proposal's greatest
potential impact on the Court is restriction of this examination
until the collateral attack stage. 5 2 Unlike due process claims,
the full faith and credit interest is not clearly implicated by the
original judgment. The typical record in challenges to a state's
exercise of personal jurisdiction contains no objections by
5
other states to the assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.'1
Further, the full faith and credit interest is a sovereign right of
the state and not a personal right of the adversely affected litigant. 5 4 The Court should manifest its reluctance to decide hypotheticai federalism disputes by avoiding considerations of
federalism in the due process calculus and awaiting a concrete
full faith and credit case, a case that would arise only on collat55
eral attack
Absent direct review of the full faith and credit claim, that
issue may never emerge from the litigation at all. If sufficient
assets are available to satisfy the judgment in the rendering
state, no interstate recognition of the judgment is required.
Even if sufficient assets are not present in the rendering state,
the state subsequently requested to enforce the judgment
could reject a collateral attack that asserts a full faith and
credit jurisdictional challenge. Indeed, such a decision to upvents waste of judicial resources that would accompany deferring resolution of
these threshold issues.
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)-(3) (1982). Appeal would lie only if the attack is
one that claims that the statute asserting jurisdiction, rather than its application in the case at bar, violates the federal constitutional guarantee of due process. In other cases, Supreme Court judicial review would be obtained by a
writ of certiorari.
152. See infra notes 153-57.
153. The atypical case is one in which a state or its agents are party defendants. See, e.g., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (state official
as defendant raised objections to personal jurisdiction and venue); cf. Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (refusal of forum court to surrender jurisdiction or
give full faith and credit to sister state's claim of partial sovereign immunity).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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hold a sister state judgment based on extraterritorial jurisdiction would be unsurprising if the current reach of most states'
long-arm statutes is a fair indication of the states' beliefs about
the nature of correlative state sovereignty.' 56 More importantly, the enforcement state's rejection of the collateral attack
manifests its view that its federalism interests are not impinged upon. Thus, the rejection will in many cases extinguish
the full faith and credit issue, removing the need for Supreme
Court federalism review. Finally, many defendants may resist
only to the point of exhausting direct review of the due process
issue, further reducing the need for Supreme Court review of
federalism issues.
Withholding direct review of full faith and credit claims
would not only reduce the number of such claims requiring
Supreme Court review but would also offer the Court better
data in those cases that do reach it. When a sister state court
upholds a collateral attack on full faith and credit grounds, it
asserts that the rendering state court's exercise of jurisdiction
impinged on its interests. Thereafter, the court's opinion
serves as a brief both delineating the sovereignty claims of its
state and illuminating the issues giving rise to a true interstate
conflict. 5 7 The Supreme Court will consequently receive on review substantive information about the affected state's attitude
toward the jurisdictional assertion and not a generalized hypothetical claim raised by an individual.
Only a modest substantive impact on Supreme Court review of interstate federalism disputes results from the proposed separation of due process from full faith and credit.
First, the Court must clarify that previous decisions limiting jurisdiction due to federalism concerns were based not on due
process but on interpretation of extant full faith and credit statuteS 5 8 or on common law developed by the Court in the absence of federal full faith and credit legislation. 5 9 The Court
need not repudiate the decisions' results or doctrines, but must
simply shift the decisions' theoretical underpinnings from constitutional to nonconstitutional grounds. It will find ample sup156. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
157. See, eg., Lewis v. Hanson, 36 DeL CIL 235, 255-61, 128 A.2d 819, 831-35
(1957) (laying out basis for the Delaware refusal to recognize the Florida judgment that ultimately gave rise to the decision in Hanson v. Denckda), afg'd sub
nom Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
158. Pennoyer v. Neff, '93 U.S. 714 (1877), is the pristine example of a case
that should fall into this category.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
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port for this reinterpretation in the history and text of both the
due process clause160 and the full faith and credit clause,161 as
well as in its own decisions.162
Second, the Court's review of future federalism disputes
resulting from state court assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction will be limited to interpreting legislation such as PKPA,163
FDCPA,164 and that proposed here.165 If Congress is silent on a
specific issue facing the Court, the Court will resolve any interstate conflict as a common law tribunal, creating policies to further national uniformity.166 In this redefined role, the Court's
basic issue analysis is likely to change little, 6 7 but it will enjoy
greater freedom in decision making because those decisions
are subject to congressional revision.168 Moreover, the Court
160. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 65-102 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text. The Court's burden of
reinterpretation is considerably lessened with recognition that Pennoyer v.
Neff, the seminal case merging federalism and due process, is in fact a holding
resting on nonconstitutional grounds. See supra text accompanying note 18.
163. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 118-25, 127-47 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
167. It is unlikely, for example, that the decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), would have changed even had the Court not been
acting as a constitutional arbiter. The Court undoubtedly was hesitant to create a constitutional barrier to a state's employment of the interest analysis
method for choice of law problems. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, Three Might-HaveBeens: A Reaction to the Symposium on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045, 1047-49 (1982). Such a barrier would create the possibility that appeal could be taken every time a litigant was dissatisfied by an interest analysis choice of law decision. Such a barrier would also disrupt the
pattern of state autonomy on experimentation in changing choice of law doctrines that has prevailed for two centuries.
The results in some cases, however, could change. For example, in WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Court found that
Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction violated defendant's due process rights.
See supra note 27. Under the proposed restructuring of federalism dispute resolution, the Court could conclude on identical facts that little personal unfairness arises from requiring a New York automobile retailer and regional
distributor belonging to an interstate marketing system from defending in the
courts of Oklahoma, the state in which the injury in issue occurred.
If the Court should hold that the due process convenience and fairness interests are satisfied, the case could proceed to trial in Oklahoma. The defendants' claim that Oklahoma overstepped the bounds of interstate federalism
would be preserved until the judgment is exported to sister states. The collateral attack on federalism grounds, however, appears unlikely to succeed.
Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction is well within the accepted norms of state
practice under long-arm statutes. See supra note 45. Moreover, Oklahoma has
a patent interest in adjudicating the original action is the situs of the accident
giving rise to the suit.
168. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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will gain the opportunity to predicate its decisions on a clearer
conception of the precise nature of the alleged interstate federalism offense. 169
IV. CONCLUSION
A proposal for a new constitutional structure for evaluating
state court assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction presents
only an intriguing intellectual exercise if it offers no promise of
adoption and advances no improvements on the present due
process analysis. The proposal discussed in this Article, however, stands a reasonable chance of congressional or judicial
adoption and offers several meaningful benefits to the federal
system.
The potential judicial adoption of the proposed severance
of due process and full faith and credit analysis is well within
the realm of possibility. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,1 7 0 as
well as other Court decisions, 7 clearly exhibits the Supreme
Court's movement toward separating interstate sovereignty
concerns from the individual's right to due process. To repeat
the Court's words in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guineel7 2 for the purpose of emphasis:
The restriction on state sovereign power ...

must be seen as ulti-

mately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause. That clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. 173

Moreover, jurisprudential and pragmatic considerations
support the proposal's adoption. Jurisprudentially, the proposal allows separate analysis of federalism concerns and litigant
convenience. Both issues will benefit by escaping from the obscure dual-issue, single-resolution determination of present
due process adjudication.1 7 4 Further, the separation permits
federalism issues to be raised in a context where the interstate
dispute is crystallized.1 7 5 Pragmatically, the proposal will decrease the number of federalism disputes presented to the
overburdened Court and simplify due process claims by eliminating their amorphous federalism facets. Finally, separating
full faith and credit concerns for federalism from due process
169. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
170. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
172. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
173. Id at 702 n.10.
174. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
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concerns for the individual offers both Congress 176 and the
Court177 vast potential for reducing interstate judicial overreaching. The means of unlocking this potential are consonant
with the constitutional structure. 78 Congress and the Court
need only consider and act accordingly.

176. See supra notes 103-48 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text. The Court, operating as
a common law tribunal, also could attempt to initiate some of the proposals discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 149-69 in conjunction with congressional legislation.
178. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.

